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Many of the organizational issues of irrigation systems in Niger
(as in other countries) are related to their financial
arrangements. The currency of Niger is the CFA franc (FCFA),
which it shares with other West African francophone countries.
In addition to stating financial information in that currency, in
order to help international readers of this publication, we also
express an equivalent value in United States dollars, generally
in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). The PPP rate
better reflects the actual impacts of prices, fees, and wages on
a Nigérien farmer or consumer, by giving a clearer idea of their
real value to that person.
The value of the FCFA has not been constant during the
period of analysis, which presents some difficulties in
interpreting the results concerning the financial viability of the
cooperatives. The nominal (bank exchange rate) value of the
currency is pegged to the French franc (FF) at a fixed parity
rate. For many years the rate was 1 FCFA = 0.02 FF, but in
mid-January 1994 it was changed to 1 FCFA = 0.01 FF, at
which it has since remained. Insofar as PPP is concerned,
prior to 1994, the PPP value of the CFA franc in Niger was
2.5–3.5 times higher than its nominal bank exchange value.
More recently (1998) the factor between the two rates has
reached about 4.5. In the meantime, two other changes have
Note on currency equivalents.
occurred. The value of the French franc, in terms of the United
States dollar and some other international currencies, has
declined. Internally, within Niger, the 1994 devaluation was
followed by sharp inflation, so the purchasing power of the
FCFA has reduced.
The figure below shows the variations of the FCFA
purchasing power parity, in terms of equivalent US cents, for
the period 1992–1996. It also shows the domestic consumer
price index for Niamey, the capital of Niger, and the seasonal
price at which the main rice-milling organization contracts to
purchase paddy from the cooperatives.
The impact of the devaluation acted initially to assist the
rice producers. However, the benefit was immediately offset by
comparable rises in prices of imported inputs such as
fertilizers, and through time, the benefit was eroded further by
general rises in prices. In real terms, the price obtained for a
kilogram of paddy in 1996 was only some 10 percent more
than it had been in early 1992.
N.B. In this report, financial information is presented in the
local currency; the applicable US dollar conversion rate is
1FCFA = 0.68 US cents (PPP exchange rate for January-
June 1995).v
Summary
This paper presents the results of case studies of
the functioning of four pump-based irrigation
systems in the Niger River Valley. These studies
were carried out between 1991 and 1997 as part
of a research-development grant from the African
Development Bank (AfDB) to the government of
Niger. The International Water Management
Institute (IWMI) was the executing agency of this
project.
The objectives and performance of these
schemes, and their prospects for sustainability are
analyzed, especially in the light of the
government’s policy of promoting irrigator
organizations to take over responsibilities for
operating and maintaining the irrigation facilities.
Overall, the irrigation systems are producing
acceptable results. The systems that have
relatively convenient market access in particular
show good performance in yield, land utilization,
and gross output. Though the performance of
remoter systems is lower, their output results are
still moderately good by current developing-
country standards for such enterprises.
The organizational arrangements in the
Nigérien  cooperatives do not conform to the
principles cited in the literature as being
characteristic of sustainable, autonomous locally-
managed organizations of irrigators. Significant
improvements in sustainability could be expected
through better adherence to the principles of
transparency, rule-compliance, autonomy from the
government, and functional decentralization. In
addition, the large size of the organizations puts
practical stresses on the available management
skills in the community. Indeed, the lack of
organizational skills in the rural environment of
Niger presents challenges to managing relatively
large new organizations, some of the order of
1,000 households.
Financial weakness of the irrigator
organizations seems to pose the most serious
threat to their sustainability. None of them has
been able to accumulate reserve funds to cater to
future needs for major repairs and renewals, and
they all face shortage of operational funds.
Lessons and recommendations for future
organizational and institutional design, with
particular emphasis on the reduction of
constraints to physical and organizational
performance, and on enhancing sustainability, are
suggested.1
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or lenders, but those sources do not generally
fund operational costs. The government’s total
annual budget is equivalent to about US$153 per
person (at PPP), so it obviously finds it difficult,
or impossible, to afford the operational cost of
about US$550–600 per hectare per year to keep
the irrigation systems functioning. On the other
hand, the alternative of financing through the
systems’ users faces different difficulties, due to
lack of organizational skills in the rural
environment.
The path of institutional development chosen
by the Government of Niger for these irrigation
systems has been through the formation of
cooperatives. These are government-sponsored
organizations, established according to a
paradigm laid down by the government. In
general, there is one cooperative corresponding
to each main irrigation pumping station.
The policy objective is to minimize (if
possible, eliminate) the financial support from
the government, by developing organizations of
water users that will be sustainable and
financially viable. In applying this policy, the
Government of Niger has gone farther than most
other governments currently pursuing such
policies, and it endeavors to ensure that the
irrigation users repay a significant share of
capital costs as well as of operational costs.
This general policy orientation dates from a
broad-based forum on rural development held at
Zinder in 1982 (République du Niger 1982). The
policy has been elaborated since then and
although there have been various political
Background
This report deals with some experiences of a set
of irrigation systems situated in the Republic of
Niger, along both banks of the Niger River. All
these systems draw water from the river through
low-lift, electrically powered pumping stations,
which have been installed by the Government of
Niger over the past 30 years. Irrigation of this
kind is not a tradition in Niger. The introduction
of this technology caused considerable changes
in the way of life of local communities. A host of
questions regarding land and water rights,
allocation of labor resources, joint financing of
communal procurement and marketing, a new
relationship with government bodies, and
procedures for framing, implementing, and
obtaining compliance with practical rules of
cooperation had to be faced in the development
of the institutional side of these enterprises.
The Republic of Niger is not endowed with
substantial financial resources. In 1995, its gross
national product per person was US$220 at the
nominal exchange rate (World Bank 1997),
equivalent to US$750 at purchasing power parity
(PPP) rate. It also faces severe human
resources problems, having the lowest adult
literacy rate in the world, at 12.4 percent, and
almost the lowest school-enrolment rate (UNDP
1995). Together, these resource weaknesses
pose great difficulties for the sustainability of the
newly introduced irrigation technology. The
capital funds for the installation of new irrigation
systems may be obtained from external donors
Introduction2
changes in the country during this period,
successive governments have adhered
consistently to the main thrust of this policy.
The detailed information presented in this
paper refers to a subset of four of these
irrigation systems, called Saga, Kourani-Baria I,
Kourani-Baria II, and Tillakaïna, which were the
subject of a research study during the period
1991–97, under a grant from the African
Development Bank to the Government of Niger.
The International Water Management Institute
(IWMI) was appointed as Executing Agency and
a study organization designated Projet
Management de l’Irrigation au Niger (PMI-Niger,
or Irrigation Management Project, Niger) was set
up to conduct the research.
Themes of the Study
Studies concerning the detailed functioning of
irrigation systems and their institutions involve
diverse factors and the linkages of causes and
effects are not always clear. In this analysis, we
seek to address the following four issues, which
should influence the institutional and
organizational design:
1. There is a high degree of interactivity among
various domains that are superficially quite
different (water management, agricultural
practices, markets and finance,
organizational constitution and processes,
management skills, irrigators’ alternative
uses of their labor, etc.), which means that
intervention by an external organization, if
designed without paying attention to all these
factors, is likely to fail.
2. There is a deficit of organizational skills in
the rural environment of a country such as
Niger, where resources of every sort are
scarce, and this presents practical difficulties
in managing relatively large new
organizations.
3. A sound set of financial procedures is
necessary to ensure solvency and viability in
these organizations, but it is difficult to
ensure these without perpetuating the
government involvement and, therefore,
attitudes of dependency on the government.
4. The organizational design in actual use is
not in conformity with the principles of
sustainability developed by Ostrom (1992).
To address these themes, the report
employs the following structural arrangement:
Firstly, we describe the context in which modern
irrigation facilities have been installed, and
organizations and institutions have been created
in Niger over the past 30 years. Secondly, we
briefly review some of the available literature
about the process of transferring control of
government-created irrigation systems to
organizations of irrigators, and about the
characteristics of irrigator organizations that may
contribute to their sustainability. Thirdly, the
performance of the four irrigation systems that
have been studied in detail is presented.
Fourthly, the specific constraints that may
restrict either the physical or the organizational
performance of the irrigation systems are
identified. Finally, we revisit the above four
themes, review the evidence about them in the
context of the four irrigation systems, and
try to extract some lessons and
recommendations for future organizational and
institutional design, with particular emphasis on
reducing constraints, and on enhancing the
likely sustainability.3
Rain-fed agriculture is possible in a narrow
belt running across the southern part,
approximately parallel to the frontier with Nigeria.
Annual rainfall in this belt varies from about
600 mm at the frontier to about 300 mm at its
northern limit (see figure 1). Isohyets of average
annual rainfall run nearly parallel to the lines of
latitude, so the agricultural potential is strongly
influenced by the latitude. In the Niger River
Valley, the mean annual rainfall is 500 mm/year
at Niamey, the republic’s capital, and declines
Context and Description of the Study Schemes
Climate and Water Resources
The geography and social features of Niger
present formidable development problems. The
country is large (1,267,000 km
2 in area), thinly
populated (9 million inhabitants in 1995, with an
overall population density of only about 7
persons per square kilometer), and land-locked
(around 1,000 km from the sea). It does not
have abundant water resources. Most of it is hot
and arid.
FIGURE 1.
Location of irrigation systems in the Niger River Valley (Inset: Isyohyets of mean rainfall, 1961–1990).4
FIGURE 2.
Mean monthly values of rainfall, evapotranspiration, and river water level at Niamey, 1950–1995.
progressively in the northward direction. The
rainy season is brief, with significant amounts of
rainfall received from June to September, but in
the latitude of Niamey July and August are the
only months when rainfall can generally be
expected to exceed potential evapotranspiration.
To the north of Niamey, adequate rainfall is
usually obtained only in August. Annual average
potential evapotranspiration at Niamey is 1,889
mm/year.
Groundwater resources are significant, and
are traditionally utilized in some arid places.
Their development is restricted by the country’s
lack of indigenous energy resources, and the
high cost of imported energy.
The annual renewable water resources of
the country are estimated at 32.5 km
3/year, of
which 29 km
3/year is carried in the Niger River,
making it the principal source of surface water
resources.
1 This may seem quite a high figure in
relation to a population of about 9 million; but it
is misleading for two reasons. First, there is no
effective water treaty to regulate the country’s
rights. Nigeria, which lies downstream and
whose population is 10 times greater, is also
heavily reliant on this river. Second, data on
annual averages do not provide information on
the wide range of variability of the river.
Although the long-term annual average discharge
at Niamey for the period 1929–1991 was 29
km
3/year, it ran at 32 km
3/year for the period
1929–1968, and in the years since 1969 it has
averaged only 23 km
3/year. The reasons for this
variability remain uncertain. Intra-year variability
is also high.
The discharge of the river at Niamey can
reach 2,000 m
3/s. However, the reliable
discharge that can be used for irrigation
development (in the absence of a storage
reservoir) is only a small fraction of this.
Figure 2 shows the monthly variations of
some key parameters: rainfall, river level, and
potential evapotranspiration, for Niamey. It will be
observed that the rise and fall of the Niger River
1The Republic of Niger shares the river with Guinea and Mali upstream, and Benin and Nigeria downstream. The length within Niger is about
550 km, or 13% of the whole length of the river. The Niger River has numerous small, ephemeral tributaries in the Republic. Though they are
small in relation to the main river, these can have significant impacts on the irrigation systems. The tributaries deliver flash floods, often with
high sediment content, in the rainy months of July and August. These events can have locally devastating effects, both by damaging existing
crops, and by temporarily waterlogging the land and thus disrupting the calendar of agricultural activities.5
are out of phase with the rainfall, with the river
reaching its maximum elevation in December or
January, three or four months after the end of the
rainy season. This is largely due to the very slow
passage of the annual flood wave through an
extensive inland delta region in Mali.
The Irrigation Systems
The irrigation potential of Niger is estimated to be
270,000 hectares, of which 140,000 hectares are
situated in the Niger River Valley. But the total
area presently developed for irrigation is only
around 78,000 hectares (FAO 1995a), which is
equivalent to about 2 percent of the total
cultivated land in the country. Cultivation of rice
along the river valley using traditional methods
began to be replaced by modern technical
irrigation in the 1960s. There are now about 42
of these modern systems, and their total nominal
command area is 9,700 hectares, so the average
system size is 230 hectares. The distribution of
these systems as well as the locations of the
four schemes for which detailed studies are
reported here, namely Saga, Kourani-Baria I,
Kourani-Baria II, and Tillakaïna, are shown in
figure 1. Together, these 4 schemes amount to
1,186 hectares, or 12.2 percent of the total area
developed so far.
The majority of the Niger River Valley
irrigation systems have been designed on the
assumption that rice will be the dominant crop,
and, in most cases, the only crop. A double-crop
system is assumed, with the wet season crop
being transplanted in early July and harvested in
November, while the dry season crop is expected
to be transplanted in early January and harvested
in May. However, the actual seasons in use by
the farmers differ from these expectations, as
discussed later. Some irrigation systems, of
which Tillakaïna is one, are not designed for rice
production but for vegetables. Such systems use
the more permeable terrace soils, somewhat
farther from the river and at higher elevations.
Water is pumped from the river, by
electrically powered pumps, and distributed to
the fields through canal networks that are
usually lined. The lift required is in the order of a
few meters, but may be somewhat higher if land
that is farther from the river is taken into
command. Electricity is supplied to the pump
stations via the main distribution system of the
national power organization NIGELEC, which in
turn imports most of its power from Nigeria.
Automated water control facilities are installed at
many key points within the irrigation systems. In
many cases, these are not now functioning as
intended. Table 1 summarizes the salient
features of the four systems that are the subject
of this detailed study.
National Food Needs
Niger faces great difficulty in ensuring food
security for its population. The recent
development of irrigated agriculture has to be
seen in this context. Its population of about 9
million (mid-1995 estimate) has an average
growth rate of 3.3 percent per year (World Bank
1997). This implies that the country has to cater
to the food requirements of nearly 300,000 extra
people every year.
Rain-fed agriculture has focused on coarse
grains, especially millet and sorghum. These are
grown on very extensive, low-yield farming
systems. An enormous increase of the extent of
these rain-fed farming systems has been
necessary to keep pace with the population
growth. However, this expansion has been
accompanied by decline in yields, which is, to
some degree, inevitable as less suitable land is
used. Niger now has the third-largest extent of
cereal-growing lands in Africa, at 7,234,000
hectares (FAO 1995b) but yields per planted
hectare remain some of the lowest in the world.
According to the national agricultural statistics,
the average yield of rain-fed millet in the years
1991–1995 was 366 kg/ha, and of sorghum,6
TABLE 1.
Principal characteristics of the four study schemes.
Characteristics Scheme
Saga Kourani Baria I Kourani Baria II Tillakaïna
Location Left bank of the Right bank of the Right bank of the Left bank of the
Niger River, Niger River, of the Niger River, of the Niger River,
10 km southeast 100 km northwest 100 km northwest 115 km northwest
of Niamey of Niamey of Niamey of Niamey
Year constructed/Year rehabilitated 1967/1987 1986/not 1989/not 1967/1983
rehabilitated rehabilitated
Mean annual rainfall (mm) 587 385 385 350
Mean annual evapotranspiration (mm) 1,890 2,060 2,060 2,060
Total developed area, S0 (ha) 407.3 425.0 267.8 86.0
Area of paddy nurseries, S1 (ha) 11.3 19.3 11.5 Not applicable
Net available area, S2 (ha) [= S0 –S1] 396.0 405.7 256.3 86.0
Area regularly cultivated,a S3 (ha) 379.4 381.4 216.3 76.6
Number of irrigated landholdings, n1 1,524 1,166 741 248
Number of users, n2 1,112 1,098 698 207
Average size of landholding (ha) [= S2/n1] 0.26 0.35 0.35 0.35
Average area cultivated per user (ha) [= S3/n2] 0.34 0.35 0.31 0.37
Wet season crop Rice Rice Rice Not applicable
Dry season crop Rice+horticulture Rice Rice Horticulture
Type of irrigation River-lift + River-lift + River-lift + River-lift +
open canal open canal open canal open canals
network network network +buried pipes
Pumping equipment 2 pump stations; 1 pump station; 1 pump station; 2 pump stations;
7 electric 4 electric 3 electric 6 electric
pump sets pump sets pump sets pump sets
Conveyance and distribution network 2 main and  1 main and 1 main and 2 main and
6 secondary 9 secondary 4 secondary 8 secondary
canals+ canals+ canals+ canals+
tertiary network tertiary network tertiary network tertiary network
Nature of farmer organization Cooperative Cooperative Cooperative Cooperative
Number of GMPb units in the cooperative 7 9 5 3
Number of GMP representatives in 49 90 50 30
the cooperative (i.e., 7 per GMP) (i.e., 10 per GMP) (i.e., 10 per GMP) (i.e., 10 per GMP)
Technical support and extension 1 perimeter 1 perimeter 1 perimeter 1 perimeter
director director director director
from ONAHAc from ONAHA from ONAHA from ONAHA
a 
This refers to the average of the areas used for computing irrigation fees during 9 seasons, from the 1992 dry season to the 1996 dry season.
b
Mutual Production Group, the lowest form of formal organization, which typically covers a secondary canal command area.
c
National Office for Irrigation Systems (See page 9 for more details).7
166 kg/ha. These yields were 73 percent and 25
percent, respectively, of the levels recorded 30
years before. At these rates of yield decline and
population increase, some 280,000 additional
hectares of rain-fed land
2 have to be brought
into use each year to sustain the existing levels
of nutrition. This causes significant impacts on
the natural environment, especially through the
loss of forest land and wildlife species that
formerly inhabited it.
The potential contribution of irrigation in this
situation is significant, although the scale of the
water resources is not sufficient to solve this
food supply dilemma. Average yields of 10,000–
12,000 kg/ha/year are obtainable with irrigated
paddy. With land productivity about 30 times
higher than that in the rain-fed systems, irrigated
agriculture offers some alleviation of the extreme
environmental pressure of continued expansion
of unirrigated methods. Another reason for
promoting rice-growing facilities in Niger is the
increasing demand for rice, especially among the
urban population. Domestic production has not
been able to satisfy this demand, and the cost
of importation, from Asian countries such as
Thailand and Pakistan, was growing, at least
until the currency devaluation of 1994 changed
the relative price advantages.
Of late, the demand for irrigated crops other
than rice has also grown. When the Tillakaïna
irrigation system was established some 20 years
ago, its principal product was green beans
destined for an export market. Since then, local
demand for irrigated vegetables and fruits,
especially in the Niamey markets, has improved.
The private-sector small irrigators who pump water
directly from the river near Niamey do not use it for
rice cultivation, but for these higher-value crops.
This rising demand for irrigated non-rice
crops complicates the task of analyzing the
performance of the irrigation systems. Not all
the irrigators can pursue the option of crops
other than rice. The Kourani-Baria systems
were not served by a reliable road until very
recently, so they could not deliver perishable
crops such as vegetables to the Niamey
markets; also, these systems experience
more flood risks. On the other hand, at the
Saga irrigation system, the attraction of
growing vegetables for the nearby Niamey
market, or for direct selling from roadside
stalls, has been strong enough to cause
some illicit extensions of the irrigation
system, and diversion of water, without
collection of corresponding fees from these
“unofficial” lands.
The Farming Community
In each of the four irrigation systems studied in
detail, the land to be irrigated was taken into the
effective control of the government, at the time
of installation of the irrigation facilities or before.
Land within the irrigation system was then
distributed among the future irrigated farmers.
Since all these irrigation systems were not built
at the same time, the rules of land distribution
were not the same in each case. It is also
possible that the views of donors of foreign
funds had some effect on the land distribution
procedures used.
In the initial allocation of the irrigated land,
priority was given to people who were former
landholders or land users in the area; people of
the surrounding areas had the next priority. The
size of family also sometimes influenced the size
of plot allocated. At Saga, the physical layout of
the system made it possible to divide it into
nearly equal land units of about 0.25 hectares
each. At the two Kourani-Baria irrigation
systems, this uniformity was not possible,
because of the nature of the terrain. The land
units therefore vary quite widely there.
2Assuming the mean annual cereal requirements of 280 kg/person and average rain-fed cereal yield of 300 kg/ha/year.8
These initial allocations were made some
years ago. The precise ownership rights on the
irrigated lands remain unclear. Former owners
dispute the action of a past government in taking
over the land without compensation. The present
users of the land are not true owners, since they
cannot sell the land if they wish to do so. The
irrigator organizations are, to some degree, in the
position of owners of the land, since they can
charge the irrigators a fee for using it, and can
evict and replace irrigators in certain
circumstances. However, these powers are not
fully in the hands of the organizations, but are
subject to a joint decision process with local
public officials.
The irrigator households generally have other
economic activities. Irrigated agriculture is the
primary activity for relatively few of them. Other
economically significant activities include
unirrigated agriculture, animal husbandry, fishing,
trading, and handcrafts. The Saga irrigation
system, being in a peri-urban location, has further
diversification of activities, including working in
the government sector. The households do not
(usually) specialize in any one activity. Nor is
there any “normal” strategy concerning the
mixture of activities undertaken by a household.
All possible combinations of these economic
activities can be found. The mixing of activities
contributes to the net income of the household. A
survey of household incomes at Saga in 1992–93
indicated that, on average, 24.9 percent of the
net income of the households, and 41.2 percent
of gross income depended on irrigated land.
Although the irrigated land units seem small,
and population density seems high at the
irrigation systems, labor cannot be considered as
an abundant resource. The amount of farm
equipment available is small, and most
agricultural activities have to be done by manual
labor. The average amount of labor required to
grow a single crop of paddy is 225 man-day-
equivalents (mde)
3 per hectare, according to the
research surveys. In these circumstances,
allocation of the labor resources of the
households among their varied economic
activities assumes considerable importance. The
household labor is likely to be applied where the
household members believe the returns are
likely to be best. One cannot assume that
households will automatically apply their labor to
their irrigated land at the agronomically optimal
time, or in some agronomically optimal intensity.
That will depend on many external or contextual
factors, which may vary from season to season
and from year to year.
A period of difficulty for the irrigators is the
onset of the wet season, usually in June.
Because the length of the season for the rain-
fed coarse grains is short, farmers cannot afford
to delay the planting of their rain-fed land. The
extent of rain-fed lands is, for most families,
much greater than the extent of their irrigated
land, and the two kinds of land may be quite far
apart. The reaction of the households to the
conflicting demands of labor at this period is not
uniform, but is affected by factors such as family
size, the timing of first rains, and the specific
mixture of activities in each household. These
labor-related problems are of greater significance
at the  Kourani-Baria irrigation systems than at
Saga. Irrigated land units at Kourani-Baria are
larger, and at Saga, labor is more readily
available for temporary employment.
Irrigator Organizations and
Management Transfer Policy
Since the Zinder Seminar of 1982 (République
du Niger 1982), the government’s policy has
been to promote irrigator organizations at each
3The unit of family labor, the man-day-equivalent (mde), is obtained by assuming that a day’s labor contributed by a woman or a child (below
15 years of age) is equivalent to 0.67 mde or 0.50 mde, respectively, and that one full day’s work is made up of 8 hours.9
of the river valley irrigation systems, and to
transfer the responsibility for operating and
maintaining the facilities to these organizations.
The new systems constructed since this (such
as the Kourani-Baria systems) were installed
with this expectation from the beginning; so, for
them, this is not a true management transfer
policy involving a drastic change in expectations
and attitudes.
Two levels of irrigator organizations were
promoted:
• GMP (Groupement Mutualiste des
Producteurs or Mutual Production
Group): This is the lowest formal level of
organization. On average, a GMP has about
150 members. Its area is hydraulically
defined. Typically, a GMP exists for the
command area of a specific secondary canal
and all tertiary canals dependent on that
secondary. The size of a GMP area usually
ranges from 40 to 60 hectares.
• Cooperative: This is the unit responsible for
an entire irrigation system, including the
main pumping station on the river. The
cooperative is usually regarded as the more
significant of the two organizations. It
controls almost all of the collection and
spending of financial resources. It also
possesses some administrative buildings:
usually at least an office and a store
enabling it to handle agricultural inputs and
crop outputs.
These two types of organizations are
established under general laws, which set
frameworks for such rural organizations.
The framework laws are not specific to irrigation.
There are, however, two other documents that
govern the activities of the organizations and
their relationship to their members. These are:
• A standard or model constitution for the
cooperative; this is supposed to be adopted
by the members at the time of establishing
their cooperative, and it has clauses
specifying how they can thereafter amend it.
• A standard contract between each irrigator
and the cooperative, which each household
head is supposed to sign before taking up a
plot of land.
The government established the agency
called ONAHA (Office National des
Aménagements Hydro-Agricoles: National Office
for Irrigation Systems) as its vehicle for
constructing irrigation facilities and delivering
operational support services to them after
construction. The services provided by ONAHA
have been gradually reduced over the past
decade. Its major contributions to irrigation
operations and maintenance can be summarized
as follows:
• ONAHA provides a system director to each
irrigation system. This official is supposed to
have an advisory role, rather than an
executive role, and is expected to help the
committees of the irrigator organizations
perform their tasks effectively.
• ONAHA repairs and services the pumping
equipment. It does not employ the pump
operators, who are locally engaged by the
cooperative.
Financing of Irrigation Services
Niger is among the poorest countries in the
world. Its government has been able to achieve
some development of irrigation, primarily through
capital investment projects funded by foreign
donors. After an irrigation system is installed, the
donor may be prepared to finance operating
costs for an initial period of a few years, but
after that the costs must somehow be met by
local resources. The Nigérien government seeks10
to arrange that the system users pay the
operational costs of irrigation systems. This
policy is being followed by an increasing number
of countries, since the 1970s. However, the self-
financing policy in Niger goes farther than most
other examples.
When we speak of “the costs of providing
irrigation,” we can identify four major
components of these costs:
1. the capital cost of building the irrigation
facilities,
2. the routine annual cost of operating and
maintaining the facilities,
3. the occasional cost of major maintenance
and renewals of the facilities, and
4. the overhead cost of any national or regional
organizations that exist to organize and
provide technical support services.
In many countries, efforts to collect irrigation
service fees aim only at the second component.
In the Philippines, where fee-collection policies
have advanced farther than in most countries of
Asia, there are contributions by users towards
the third and fourth items, but they are not large,
and payment is spread over several decades.
The Nigérien government has developed a
system of fee calculation, which is imposed on
the cooperatives. Each cooperative employs its
own accountant, but the system director
(provided by ONAHA) is in a position to monitor
compliance with the official approach.
4 The items
considered in the computation of irrigation
service fees can be divided into two categories:
(a) actual expenditures incurred for system
operation and maintenance for which the
cooperative is required to make direct payments
(e.g., wages, goods and services such as
4This is a substantial reduction of the idea of independent decision making by the cooperatives as associations that are theoretically respon-
sible to their own members.
electricity); and (b) items that do not require any
current payment, representing capital charges for
system facilities and equipment (primarily
pumps), and also savings for the eventual
replacement of these items.
Accounts are compiled for each season. A
specimen seasonal account for the Saga
cooperative is given in the annex. The seasonal
account is closed at the end of each season.
The fee that each irrigator should pay during the
immediately following season is calculated
according to their proportionate share of the
area cultivated during the season in which the
costs were incurred. Irrigators whose crop fails
through no fault of their own (for example, those
affected by flood, pest attack, or water shortage)
may be exonerated. On the other hand, those
who fail to plant in a season when the
committee considers that they could have done
so, may be held liable to pay a fee share.
The irrigation service fee is large, by current
international standards. The main reasons for this
are the high cost of energy for pumping and the
inclusion of capital charges. The average fee at
the three rice-growing systems, Saga, Kourani-
Baria I, and Kourani-Baria II for ten seasons from
1992 to 1996 was 61,970 FCFA/ha/season
(equivalent to about US$425 per hectare per
season at the average PPP rate of exchange for
1995–96). Fees are supposed to be paid in an
equivalent amount of crop, but at Saga, the
alternative of cash payment is being used
increasingly. The conversion of cash amounts to
paddy equivalents is calculated at a nationally
agreed rate, in which the National Union of
Cooperatives bargains with the rice-milling
organization and announces the new season’s
paddy prices before the start of each season.
The cooperatives can supply inputs and
services to the members, and collect the
corresponding charges in the same manner as
the irrigation fees. This has attractions11
particularly for the farmers at the more remote
sites, where access to private-sector suppliers of
inputs such as fertilizers may be difficult. A
greater attraction is the implicit provision of
credit. The irrigator who takes fertilizer from the
cooperative store at the beginning of a season
does not have to repay its cost until just before
the end of the subsequent season. Hence, the
effective grace period is nearly a year.
The capital charges, which ONAHA requires
the cooperatives to include in their accounts and
fee computations, are not the same as the
amortization payments required in the Philippines
after agreed capital work has been executed by
the government. In the Philippine case, irrigator
organizations must in turn repay funds to the
government agency. In Niger, the payment is
retained by the cooperative for the savings
system just outlined.
The Nigérien system is unusual in that it
does not use a fixed fee (which is the normal
practice in Asian countries, if irrigation service
fees are levied) but a “true cost” calculation, the
result of which has to be available and published
to the members very soon after the end of each
season. It is clear that such a system requires
higher skills in accounting and general
management than does a fixed-fee system, in
which adjustments may occur only occasionally,
at intervals of perhaps, many years.
Organizations of Irrigators
In this case study of specific Nigérien
organizations of irrigators, it is not possible to
offer a comprehensive review of the
considerable literature dealing with irrigator
organizations in general, or of the efforts of
governments to promote new organizations and
use them as a tool in advancing certain irrigation
policies. However, some key elements of the
recent literature, which seem to be relevant to
the conditions observed in the Nigérien systems,
are summarized below. We may note that there
is a preponderance of Asian cases in the
relevant literature, and the applications to the
different circumstances of sub-Saharan Africa
are not always confirmed.
Locally Created Organizations
Locally generated organizations, if their
primary purpose is to provide irrigation
services, are frequently referred to as Farmer-
Managed Irrigation Systems (FMIS). This
terminology is used strictly in situations where
the farmer organization controls the water
source.
Ostrom (1992) compiled an extensive
database on FMIS from many countries, and used
it to develop a set of eight principles, which appear
to be strongly correlated with sustainability. The
principles can be summarized as follows.
1. Clarity: There are clear boundaries and rules
about who has rights to water.
2. Equity: Rules ensure that each member’s
contributions and benefits are in balance.
3. Flexibility: Rules can be modified by
collective decision of the members.
4. Transparency and accountability: Monitoring
of conditions and actions is done by users or
by people accountable to them.
5. Compliance with rules: Violators of rules
receive graduated penalties, decided by other
users or by people accountable to them.12
6. Conflict resolution: Arrangements exist for
settling conflicts, among users or between
users and officials, quickly and at low cost.
7. Autonomy: Government authorities recognize
the users’ right to devise their own
organization and rules.
8. Decentralization: There are different levels of
organization, which deal with different
functions and decisions.
Yoder’s (1994) work on FMIS focused on the
practical issue of how governments can relate to
these organizations. His studies agree with the
above principles at most points, and he adds
others to finally arrive at a set of eleven
characteristics of successful locally managed
irrigation systems. In addition to these general
reviews of the subject, numerous studies of
individual organizations have been published.
Government-Sponsored Organizations
In recent times, many governments have
introduced new policies, which involve transfer of
rights and duties to the irrigators as a
community in irrigation systems that are owned
and established by the government. The
implementation of such policies requires some
kind of organization of the irrigators, with which
the government can negotiate and arrange the
transfers. If there is no pre-existing organization
appropriate for the implementation of the policy
objective, then the government will take steps to
promote the formation of such an organization.
The essential problem faced by many
governments in this regard is that these
organizations tend to remain dependent on the
government, and their leaders look to
government agencies (rather than to their own
members) as the source of their legitimacy, and
in many cases, the source of their financial
support. On the other hand, the members and
office holders, being aware that the existence of
the organization is important to government
policy objectives, may take advantage of this
state of affairs to extract concessions and
subsidies from the government.
Hunt (1989) used the concept of the “charter
of authority” to describe this dilemma. The
“charter” is generally a concept, rather than a
real document. The holder of the charter of
authority is the person or the organization that
has effective power to make major decisions—
making or ratifying rule changes, deciding
whether large physical changes will be made or
not. In government-constructed systems, the
charter of authority almost always rests with a
government agency. Bureaucratic attitudes make
it quite difficult to change this perception. The
management issue here is: how can these
government-sponsored organizations be
reoriented, so that they become truly
independent of government, and accountable to
their own members? How can the charter of
authority be passed effectively to the new
organizations of the users?
In practice, there are two levels to this
problem. In relatively small irrigation systems,
governments try to sponsor single organizations
that can take complete control of a whole
irrigation system. In larger systems, where the
irrigation facilities may often be more complex
and technically more difficult to handle and
maintain, the government usually aims to create
a number of organizations internally to each
system, but does not aim to relinquish all its
involvement in the main system operation. This
second case, which is more difficult, is not
present among the Niger River Valley schemes,
so we shall not pursue it here.
Cernea and Meinzen-Dick (1994) reviewed
the experience of projects financed by the World
Bank, in which the promotion of new
organizations of irrigators was a significant
component. They, like Yoder, and as in Ostrom’s
fourth and fifth principles, stress the importance
of accountability of water user associations to all13
their members rather than to a subset such as
large farmers or those in one part of the system,
or to the irrigation agency.
They also note a problem that is often faced
by government officials who feel it is necessary
to give the organization a lot of freedom of
action to develop its organizational strength. But
what if this leads to deficient performance by the
irrigation system? Not every new, inexperienced
organization can be relied on to make sound
decisions. The authors observe: “In some
instances, independent water user associations
will not produce the same results the agency
would desire, or will not produce results at the
desired time.” This poses a dilemma for field
officials of irrigation agencies, especially
engineers, who may feel that performance goals
should always be supreme.
Cernea and Meinzen-Dick note specifically
about the Niger case, that this perception of
nonuniformity has itself led to difficulty in
transferring the charter of authority.
Bureaucracies prefer uniformity and the
application of rule systems with wide generality.
This is at variance with the need for diversity of
organization and localized rule-systems, which
characterize irrigation systems, because of their
great range of difference in many essential
dimensions such as land and water resources,
market access, financial resources, economic
alternatives, and traditional structures. Issues of
this kind have persuaded many people that the
transfer of the charter of authority depends
largely on changes of attitude within the
sponsoring bureaucracy itself. The experience of
the National Irrigation Administration in the
Philippines, recorded in several papers in Korten
and Siy (1989), has been most often quoted in
this regard.
Cernea and Meinzen-Dick also address the
question of the optimal size of these
organizations. In particular, they are concerned
with the appropriate size for the “base unit” of
an organization, meaning the smallest
organizational unit in a hierarchy that may also
include larger units fulfilling different functions in
what Ostrom calls a “nested” system. The size
of an organization is most frequently considered
in terms of the number of members or the
number of hectares although various other
measures are possible. Cernea and Meinzen-
Dick, noting that the optimal size depends on
certain balances or trade-offs, which in turn
depend on local contexts, observe (based to
some extent on conclusions of Addison 1986):
“…the costs of maintaining an organization,
particularly in terms of conflict resolution and
information management, will increase with the
size of an organization. There are no economies
of scale to be expected in this respect. Groups
should be large enough, however, to accomplish
the designated tasks by collective action. The
median size of approximately 40 hectares found
in the examination of Bank-sponsored projects
appears to offer a reasonable compromise
between these two factors….The farmers
themselves are best able to determine the exact
boundaries of actual units. Therefore, flexibility in
the actual size of each unit must be allowed.”
This recommendation of 40 hectares as the
rough guideline for the optimal base unit does
not say how many farmers may be involved. In
South and Southeast Asia, an area of 40
hectares may typically be expected to mean
about 40–50 farm households, whereas, in Niger
and neighboring West African countries, it may
mean 50–200 households. However, Cernea and
Meinzen-Dick also mention cases where
organizational units were found to be too large.
These include a case with 900 households,
described as “administratively impossible.”
We can surmise that the levels of education
and organizational experience should probably
be relevant to this issue of size. These factors
are likely to be scarce in more remote
environments. Good communication is essential
for achieving transparency and accountability,
and is less likely to be achieved in a large14
group. These considerations may lead us to the
view that the optimal size of base units in an
organization of irrigators should be smaller in
places that are relatively remote and
impoverished.
The ownership of irrigation facilities is
another issue that arises regularly in the process
of establishing government-sponsored
organizations of irrigators. In Niger, and in many
other cases, where irrigator organizations have
taken over the operation and maintenance of
irrigation facilities, ownership of the facilities
themselves has not been transferred to the
irrigator organizations. This can affect the
attitudes of the organizations to undertake the
responsibility for major maintenance and
renewals, for which they are supposed to set
aside savings. Vermillion and Garcés-Restrepo
(1996) report a similar situation at two systems
in Colombia, where after turnover, farmers did
not raise a capital replacement fund as they
expected that the government would pay for any
future costs of rehabilitation or structural
replacement.
Performance of the Irrigation Systems
Generalities
In this section, we present the research findings
about the performance of the four irrigation
systems. Performance assessment enables
verification of the degree to which targets and
objectives are being realized. It also provides the
different stakeholders (system managers,
farmers, and policy makers) a better
understanding of how a system operates. It
helps diagnose problems and  identify ways and
means of improving the system. Performance
can be assessed in various domains (agronomic,
financial, resource consumption, etc.) and at
different time scales. In the present study, we
seek to examine two sets of questions:
• Productivity or resource-use issues: Are
water, land, irrigation facilities, and human
and financial resources being used in
sufficiently productive ways?
• Institutional issues: Is the current institutional
policy, based on developing the role of the
cooperatives, succeeding in producing local
organizations that will be viable, sustainable
without government subsidies, and able to
satisfy the aims of their members?
Outputs and Output Value
Table 2 shows the ONAHA data on the extent of
paddy cultivated between 1989 and 1996 in the
three rice-producing schemes studied (Saga,
Kourani-Bari I, and Kourani-Baria II) and table 3
provides information on outputs and yields in the
three schemes.
Table 4 shows the  gross values of output
per hectare achieved in the four irrigation
systems, according to sample surveys
conducted for at least one year at each of the
four systems. These surveys were conducted in
different years, and the money values of output
have been converted to a common base of dry
season (i.e., January–June 1995) values, using
the official indexes of cereal and vegetable
prices in Niamey markets as the best available
measures of price inflation. The data of table 4
do not indicate the trend of production. At the
rice-producing schemes, agronomic yields and
crop intensity are estimated by ONAHA in each15
TABLE 2.
Utilization of land in the three rice-producing study schemes, 1989–96.
Season                                        Area cultivated (ha)
Saga Kourani Baria I Kourani Baria II Total
Dry 89 375.0 405.0 Still under construction
Wet 89 373.0 403.3 252.9 1,029.2
Dry 90 380.0 405.2 252.9 1,038.1
Wet 90 381.0 405.2 248.8 1,035.0
Dry 91 376.0 405.0 250.0 1,031.0
Wet 91 376.0 405.0 250.0 1,031.0
Dry 92 375.0 406.0 251.0 1,030.0
Wet 92 381.0 391.0 216.0  988.0
Dry 93 381.0 406.0 249.0 1,030.0
Wet 93 381.0 387.0 240.0 1,008.0
Dry 94 380.0 390.0 254.7 1,024.7
Wet 94 376.0 360.4 200.8 937.2
Dry 95 380.0 403.0 88.2  871.2
Wet 95 380.0 325.0 234.0  939.0
Dry 96 380.0 405.0 255.0 1,040.0
Mean values
Dry 378.4 403.2 228.7 1,005.7
Wet 378.6 382.4 234.6  998.8
Annual 757.0 785.6 463.3 2,004.5
Source: ONAHA, Service Suivi-Evaluation: Monitoring and evaluation service of ONAHA.
TABLE 3.
Production and mean yield of paddy at the three rice-producing schemes, 1989–96.
Season Saga Kourani-Baria I Kourani-Baria II Total
Production Mean yield Production Mean yield Production Mean yield Production Mean yield
(tonnes) (kg/ha) (tonnes) (kg/ha) (tonnes) (kg/ha) (tonnes) (kg/ha)
Dry89 1,770 4,720      2,251      5,557 aa
Wet89 1,737 4,656 1,841 4,564 1,458 5,767 5,036 4,893
Dry90 1,735 4,567 1,633 4,029 1,363 5,151 4,671 4,500
Wet90 1,992 5,226 2,212 5,458 1,321 5,308 5,525 5,338
Dry91 2,369 6,301 2,227 5,498 * *
Wet91 1,964 5,224 ****
Dry92 1,592 4,245 2,424 5,970 1,180 4,700 5,196 5,035
Wet92 1,943 5,100 1,132 2,894 977 4,522 4,052 4,101
Dry93 2,084 5,469 2,139 5,348 1,139 4,574 5,362 5,206
Wet93 1,972 5,175 1,124 2,903 954 3,972 4,050 4,018
Dry94 2,093 5,508b 1,236 3,168b 1,180 4,634b 4,509 4,400
Wet94 * * 1,080 2,996b 698 3,474 b
Dry 95 1,862 4,898 1,082 2,683 261 2,959 c 3,205 3,679
Wet95 1,801 4,739 525 1,612 832 3,557 3,157 3,362
Dry96 2,019 5,312 1,821 4,493 1,473 5,785 5,313 5,109
          Mean values
Dry 1,940.5 5,128 1,851.6 4,593 1,089.3 4,763 4,709.3 4,683
Wet 1,901.5 5,021 1,318.8 3,449 1,040.0 4,433 4,364.0 4,365
Annual 3,842.0 10,149 3,170.4 8,042 2,129.3 9,196 9,073.3 9,048
Sources: ONAHA, Service Suivi-Evaluation.




Kourani-Baria II under construction.
bONAHA data not available; PMI-Niger data used instead.
cONAHA data for yield; cooperative’s data for area.16
TABLE 4.
Gross value of output per hectare in the four study schemes.
Irrigation Season Value of production at Area Area Production value Production value
system dry season 1995 prices cultivated developed per cultivated hectare per developed hectare
(million FCFA) (ha) (ha) (‘000 FCFA/ha) (‘000 FCFA/ha)
Saga Dry 93 199.2 380.0 407.3 524.1 489.1
Wet 93 198.0 380.0 407.3 521.1 486.1
Annual 397.2 760.0 407.3 522.6 975.2
Kourani- Dry 94 116.9 390.0 425.0 299.7 275.1
Baria I Wet 94 102.1 360.4 425.0 283.4 240.2
Annual 219.0 750.4 425.0 291.8 515.3
Kourani Dry 94 111.6 254.7 267.8 438.2 416.7
Baria II Wet 94 66.0 200.8 267.8 328.6 246.5
Annual 177.6 455.5 267.8 389.9 663.2
Tillakaïna 1993-94 81.6 76.1 86.0 1,072.6 948.8
Total Annual 875.4 2,042.0 1,186.1 428.7 738.0
Notes:
1. Production values are based on “farm-gate” prices i.e., prices received by producers without any element of transport or other marketing cost.
2. Prices are converted to a common basis of dry season 1995 by suitable price adjustments.
3. 1 FCFA= 0.68 US cents (PPP exchange rate for January-June 1995).
season but the estimation of vegetable and fruit
areas, outputs, and values is not done
regularly— these estimates would require a
much greater amount of work.
In summary, these data show that:
• The average gross value of production at the
four systems studied was 738,000 FCFA per
year per developed hectare. This is equivalent
to US$1,464 (using the average bank
exchange rate for January-June 1995 of
1,000 FCFA = US$1.98) or US$ 5,018 (at the
PPP rate for that period).
• There were large variations in the observed
performance. The Kourani-Baria I and II
systems produced at 69.8 percent and 89.9
percent, respectively, of the average rate,
whereas Saga and Tillakaïna produced at 132
percent and 129 percent, respectively, of the
average.
• In the rice-producing systems, table 3 does
not indicate any clear trend, upward or
downward, in the total production obtained in
these irrigation systems. Table 2 suggests
that land utilization in some of the systems
(especially Kourani-Baria I) may be
decreasing. But land utilization varies under
short-term climatic variables such as drought
and flood, and the length of record is not
enough to show clearly whether any long-term
trends are also present.
Use and Productivity of Water
Water use was considered at three levels: the
amount pumped from the river into the irrigation
system, the amounts received at the field in
sample landholdings, and the degree of equity
in distribution among the GMP (Mutual
Production Group) areas.
Water deliveries are not normally measured
at any point in these irrigation systems. The
measurements discussed in this section were
made as part of the research studies. The
amounts delivered into the irrigation systems
were based on analysis of the records of pump
operating hours, which are maintained at every
pump station and indicate the daily times of
starting and stopping, for each pump unit17
separately. Pump calibration curves were
developed by combining the pump
characteristics published by the manufacturer
with on-site measurements of present
capacities. Some stations had river-level records
as well, but in some cases, the measuring
scales no longer existed. For those, the daily
magnitudes of the required lift were found from
various records of river levels at locations
upstream or downstream, adjusted according to
observed seasonal values of river surface
gradients.
Water deliveries to the borders of individual
fields were measured in sample fields, using
observations of the rise in water level in the rice
field during each irrigation event, with an
adjustment to allow for water evaporation and
percolation occurring during the period of the
irrigation. The samples were of about 60 fields in
each irrigation system (except Tillakaïna, which
cannot be measured in this relatively simple
way, as it does not grow rice). Observations
were made in both wet and dry seasons.
These measurements produced information
about water use, which is not normally available
to managers or users of these irrigation
systems. In the absence of water measurement
facilities, their information about water
consumption is based solely on the monthly bills
for electricity. These bills are shared, under the
accounting system, among all users, in
proportion to the sizes of their landholdings.
Table 5 summarizes findings at three of the
systems, with regard to the amounts and costs
of water delivered. In this table, the standard
fixed capital and renewal charges for pumping
equipment (see page 10, under Financing of
Irrigation Services) are included as part of the
cost of providing water, along with all other
water-related costs such as pumping energy,
operator wages, and so on.
TABLE 5.
Quantities and costs of irrigation water deliveries.
Item Units Saga Saga Saga Saga Kourani-Baria I Tillakaïna
Dry 92 Wet 92 Wet 94 Dry 95 Wet 92 Dry 93 91–92
Water-related 000 FCFA 4,675.1 4,675.1 4,675.1 4,675.1 3,210.3 3,210.3 2,740.1
fixed costs
Energy costs 000 FCFA 6,813.7 4,982.7 5,419.3 6,642.3 6,407.8 8,431.8 5,255.3
Other variable costs 000 FCFA 2,008.5 2,020.7 8,698.5 5,197.6 3,126.7 2,672.2 1,502.1
Total costs 000 FCFA 13,497.3 11,678.5 18,792.9 16,514.0 12,744.8 14,314.3 9,497.6
Water deliveries
Volume pumped 000 m3 5,682.9 2,487.0 3,112.6 3,875.8 4,947.1 7,735.6 2,145.8
Deliveries to 000 m3 3,080.1 1,352.9 1,864.4 2,282.8 2,028.3 4,138.5 –
landholdings
Costs per cubic meter
Water–related FCFA/m3 0.82 1.88 1.50 1.21 0.65 0.41 1.28
fixed costs
Energy costs FCFA/m3 1.20 .00 1.74 1.71 1.30 1.09 2.45
Other variable costs FCFA/m3 0.35 0.81 2.79 1.34 0.63 0.35 0.70
Total costs/m3 FCFA/m3 2.38 4.70 6.04 4.26 2.58 1.85 4.43








Overall productivity of irrigation water.
Irrigation system Season Value of production at Volume of water Value of production
dry season 1995 prices pumped into the system per unit of water pumped
(million FCFA) (‘000 m3) (FCFA/m3)
Saga Wet 93 199.2 3,216.0 61.9
Saga Dry 94 198.0 5,908.1 33.5
Kourani-Baria I Dry 94 116.9 7,634.7 15.3
Kourani-Baria I Wet 94 102.1 4,334.9 23.6
Kourani-Baria I Dry 95  99.1 6,475.5 15.3
Notes:
1. Kourani-Baria I and II pump data are not complete. Wherever possible, gaps in the data have been filled by estimation, based upon other
years and the areas in cultivation.
2. For the calculation of seasonal water volumes, the wet season is considered here as half the month of June plus all of the months July to
November.
Table 6 shows some examples of the
productivity obtained with the water delivered.
The findings in regard to water use are, in
summary:
• Conveyance losses (although the main and
secondary canals are generally concrete-
lined) were found to be in the range of 40–60
percent (table 5).
• The cost of delivering a cubic meter of water
to the farmer’s field was found to vary
between 3.5 and 10 FCFA. Costs were lower
in the dry seasons, because (a) the pumping
lift is less (as river water levels are highest in
the early part of the dry season), and (b) the
volume of water required is more, which
means that fixed charges are spread over a
larger volume.
• The value of production, per unit of water
pumped into the irrigation system, in the dry
seasons, varied between 15.3 FCFA/m
3 and
33.5 FCFA/m
3. When calculated on the basis
of water delivered at the field, these figures
improve to 30.6 and 67 FCFA/m
3.
• The value of production exceeds the total cost
of providing water by a factor of about 7 on
average.
• There is no evidence of any trend of
increase or decrease in water consumption
or water productivity.
The equity of water distribution was studied
at the level of the secondary or GMP units. The
results of measurements of water received at
sets of sample land holdings throughout one dry
season in the Saga and Kourani-Baria I system
are shown in table 7 and figures 3a and 3b. It is
observed that higher land productivity is obtained
in the GMP areas, where fields are better
supplied with water. But water productivity shows
an opposite trend. This is consistent with the
fact that farmers are more concerned with
maximizing returns from their (limited) land-
holdings and will tend to take as much water as
possible to achieve this objective. There is little
incentive to reduce water use. Volumetric
measurements of water to individual fields are
not made. Water (and energy) costs are
apportioned among all farmers according to the
size of their landholdings.
The conveyance losses of 40–60 percent,
noted in table 5, may seem unexpectedly high,
since the principal canals are concrete-lined.
Losses are probably occurring in three ways:
leakage from the lined canals, through cracks
and deteriorated joints; leakage from unlined
tertiary channels; and overspill of water to the19
drains. The last of these may explain higher
losses at Kourani-Baria I, where the pump
facilities are not adequate for the irrigated area.
Hence, night irrigation is often necessary, but is
difficult to organize. No analysis of these
different types of loss has been done. The high
level of losses may confirm findings of other
researchers, for example, Upton and Chancellor-
Weale (1988), who found that in Indian systems
linings were effective for seepage reduction only
for a few years, probably due to environmental
stresses and deficiencies of maintenance.
Costs
The costs of irrigated agriculture for a sample of
irrigator households and the costs to the cooperatives
of providing irrigation services were analyzed.
Table 8 shows the household costs of
production. The components included here are:
all agricultural inputs, paid labor, and irrigation
fees, plus the estimated opportunity costs of
seasonal capital and of family labor.
Table 9 shows the net returns obtained by
the household, in terms of net revenue per
person-day of family labor (in this case, net
revenue is taken to be crop value minus all
costs except the opportunity cost of family
labor).
At the household level, these tables show
that,
• In general, irrigated agriculture is profitable
for the households. This is not an
unexpected result, since the demand for
irrigated plots, when any plot becomes
vacant, is said to be high, and land
utilization remains high except in climatically
adverse seasons.
• Costs, including family labor valued at
opportunity cost, are usually about 70–80
percent of crop value; the average is 75.4
percent.
• Irrigation fees are generally in the range
12–25 percent of gross crop value. This is
TABLE 7.
Variations of water supply and yield between GMP units in the Saga and Kourani-Baria I schemes.
Saga : Dry season 1994 Kourani-Baria I : Dry season 1995
GMP No. of Mean total Mean Crop production No. of Mean total Mean Crop production
number land- water delivered crop per unit of land- water delivered crop per unit
holdings to the field yield water delivered holdings to the field yield of water delivered
sampled (mm) (kg/ha) (kg/m3) sampled (mm) (kg/ha) (kg/m3)
1 5 658.4 7,400 1.124 6 423.0 2,795 0.661
2 8 421.1 4,920 1.168 5 355.6 1,947 0.548
3 12 449.5 4,786 1.065 9 401.2 3,313 0.826
4 8 620.2 5,642 0.910 4 418.2 2,239 0.535
5 4 649.6 6,474 0.997 3 427.3 2,959 0.692
6 9 540.3 5,541 1.026 9 624.1 3,066 0.491
7 3 491.3 6,018 1.225 9 565.9 3,397 0.600
5 619.2 3,458 0.558
8 563.3 3,073 0.545
Whole system 49 529.6 5,566 1.051 58 503.4 3,003 0.597
Notes:
1. The column “crop production per unit of water” is based on the volumes of water delivered to the sample landholdings.
2. If we wish to consider the overall productivity of the water pumped into the irrigation system (as in table 6) it will be between 40–60 percent
of these figures, because much of the water that is pumped into the irrigation systems does not reach the landholdings but is lost to
seepage.20
FIGURE 3A.
Influence of water deliveries on yields in different GMP
areas in the Saga and Kourani-Baria I schemes.
FIGURE 3B.
Influence of water deliveries on water productivity in
different GMP areas in the Saga and Kourani-Baria I
schemes.
TABLE 8.
Mean costs of production per hectare (Units: FCFA/hectare).
Cooperative and season Direct costs Opportunity costs Total
Paid Other Inputs Irrigation Total Capital Family Total costs
labor immediate bought fees direct labor opportunity of
expenses at the costs costs production
co-operative
Saga wet 93 92,108 37,540 10,430 60,190 200,260 29,170 91,270 120,440 20,700
Saga dry 94 104,780 46,340 13,540 62,890 227,480 34,000 106,360 140,360 367,840
Kourani-Baria I dry  94 36,700 8,000 43,250 59,830 147,780 10,060 69,370 79,430 227,150
Kourani-Baria I wet  94 43,890 6,390 50,780 60,670 161,730 11,310 58,430 69,740 231,470
Kourani-Baria I dry  95 37,510 6,940 39,020 64,710 148,180 10,000 69,370 79,370 227,550
Kourani-Baria II dry 94 65,410 8,220 46,350 51,470 171,430 16,560 70,150 86,710 258,140
Kourani-Baria II wet 94 47,760 9,650 54,470 70,460 182,350 12,920 58,880 71,800 254,150
Kourani-Baria II dry 95 31,550 31,680 12,260 81,000 156,500 14,230 70,160 84,390 240,890
Tillakaïna wet 93-dry 94 39,610 3,770 53,140 208,310 304,790 9,760 100,130 109,8904 14,680
Source: PMI-Niger field surveys (Socioeconomic section for Kourani-Baria I&II, SS94; Agronomy section for all other lines).
Notes:
1. All data represent actual expenditures at current prices. No price adjustments for inflation effects are used.
2. (a) The opportunity cost of family labor was taken to be the same as the prevailing local rates for salaried labor: Saga (wet season) =
    750 FCFA/mde (For mde definition, see footnote 3); Saga (dry season) = 800 FCFA/mde; All other sites = 500 FCFA/mde; the values at
   Saga are higher on account of its proximity to the capital city, Niamey.
    (b) The opportunity cost of capital was taken to be equivalent to 50 % per year (or 22.5 % per 6-month season), based on the work of
    Kaboré et al. (1994); this rate was applied to all items of immediate costs, essentially salaried labor and fertilizer purchases
    from outside suppliers.
3. Tillakaïna data refer to a period of 12 months. All other lines refer to periods of 6 months.21
high by the standards usually reported from
Asian irrigation systems, and is primarily
because of the high energy cost element,
and the inclusion of substantial capital
elements.
• The returns to family labor are on average
around double the current cost of unskilled
manual labor in the same areas. This again
seems to confirm or explain the motivation
of the households towards irrigated
agriculture.
• However, this margin may be necessary to
maintain that motivation. When a sample of
about 150 households is examined in detail,
the variation of results is found to be wide,
and for a few households the returns are
negative. At Kourani-Baria I, as tables 8 and
9 show, the average margins obtained are
less satisfactory; there is also indication of
some decline in cropping intensity (table 2).
It seems plausible that this represents a loss
of motivation among the less successful
irrigators, who may be giving preference to
other activities in their allocation of
household resources.
Figure 4 shows how the costs incurred by
the cooperatives have varied over recent years.
The values shown here are total seasonal costs,
inclusive of capital and renewal charges; so
these are exactly equivalent to the fee charges
that will be levied from farmers during the
course of the ensuing season.
Costs have been rather stable, especially
when the effects of devaluation and inflation are
taken into account. The variation among the
three rice-producing systems is almost
negligible. The effective level of costs improved
after the currency devaluation of January 1994.
The irrigation fees rose by 25 percent or less, in
the subsequent two-and-half years, while the
general cost of living index went up by about 50
percent. This is largely because the formula for
calculating capital charges has no inflation
adjustment.
TABLE 9.
Net returns per unit of family labor.
Irrigation Season Gross Total costs of Net revenue Family Net revenue Current Ratio of
system value of production to farm labor per unit of cost of net evenue
production (not including families inputs family labor agricultural to current
family labor) labor cost of labor
(FCFA/ha) (FCFA/ha) (FCFA/ha) (mde/ha) (FCFA/mde) (FCFA/mde)
Saga Wet 93 429,800 229,400 200,400 121.7 1,646.8 750 2.20
Saga Dry 94 521,050 261,500 259,560 132.9 1,952.4 800 2.44
Kourani-Baria I Dry 94 299,700 157,800 141,880 138.7 1,022.6 500 2.11
Kourani-Baria I Wet 94 283,400 173,000 110,350 121.7 906.9 500 1.81
Kourani-Baria I Dry 95 280,100 158,200 121,910 138.7 878.7 500 1.76
Kourani-Baria II Dry 94 438,300 188,000 250,340 140.3 1,784.3 500 3.57
Kourani-Baria II Wet 94 328,600 195,300 133,370 117.8 1,132.6 500 2.27
Kourani-Baria II Dry 95 222,400 170,700 51,690 140.3 368.4 500 0.74
Tillakaïna Wet 93 845,700 314,500 531,170 200.3 2,652.3 500 5.30
Dry94
Notes:
1. Prices and costs refer to the year in which the surveys were conducted.
2. Costs and production values per hectare are based on cultivated hectares, not developed hectares.
3. In this table, the column “Total costs of production” includes all cash costs and payments to the cooperatives, plus the
    opportunity cost of capital employed. No cost of family labor is included.22
Fee Collection and Operating Finances
of the Irrigator Organizations
The cooperatives have to finance their activities
by collecting irrigation service fees from the
irrigators. In addition, they collect charges for
other services that they may provide, such as
supply of inputs (especially fertilizers). They may
also give loans to members, which will have to
be recovered. In the following paragraphs, we
use the word “fees” to mean the standard
payment per hectare, which everyone who
cultivates is required to make; and we use the
word “charges” to mean payments required for
extra services such as input supply, which are to
some extent optionally requested by irrigators
individually.
There is no profit element in the fee
computation. It may be possible for the
cooperative to make some profit on input supply
charges, but the scope for this is not great. On
the other hand, the capital elements of the fees
do not have to be paid out to anyone, and so it
has been assumed that the cooperatives would
accumulate surplus funds in the bank, which
would also generate interest income at least until
they were required to be used for equipment
renewals. In fact, all the cooperatives have
struggled financially. Some have not been able
to make timely payments for services they
receive. No cooperative has accumulated the
expected savings.
A major reason has been late payment of
fees and charges by the irrigators. They do not
easily escape altogether from payments,
because individual accounts are maintained and
unpaid arrears are carried over from one season
to the next. The cooperatives also have
power under the standard form of constitution, to
evict members from their irrigated land, if they
persist in arrears. However, a certain level of
arrears remains and seems to be difficult to
eliminate.
Figures 5 and 6 show the patterns of arrears
at the cooperatives of Saga and Kourani-Baria
II. A member is allowed one season to pay the
FIGURE 4.
Seasonal costs of providing irrigation services, 1990–1996.23
normal fees and charges of the preceding
season. If the member does not pay within this
permitted time, then at the end of that season
the debt will be classified as “arrears.” Hence at
each change of season, the total of arrears
increases in a sharp step. Through each season,
the cooperative collects some outstanding
arrears; then, at the end of the season, a fresh
increment of unpaid amounts is added,
producing the “saw-tooth” profiles shown in
figures 5 and 6.
Unfortunately, the research team was not
able to develop histories of arrears at the
Kourani-Baria I and Tillakaïna cooperatives, in
the same manner as in figures 5 and 6. (This is
not surprising, since the level of accounting work
required to keep track of some thousands of
individual accounts is quite large, and the
arrears problem was not given close attention
initially). However, there seems no reason to
suppose that they would show a very different
trend from the two shown, except that the actual
level of debt at Kourani-Baria I seems at the
present time to be substantially greater than the
others (see below, table 10).
The problem that confronts all the
cooperatives is essentially one of cash flow.
They have no way to augment their cash
resources, because the standard fee-calculation
system is rigid and only allows them to levy fees
in exact accordance with their expenditure. The
cooperatives’ needs for working capital have
been growing, due to various reasons:
• The devaluation of 1994 has increased the
nominal amount of their cash transactions by
about 25 percent.
• The state-owned agricultural bank failed in
the early 1990s, during an early phase of the
government’s economic reform program.
Some of the cooperatives had placed
resources there; these accounts have since
been described as “frozen,” and it is not
clear whether any will eventually be
recovered.
• In the more remote systems at Kourani-
Baria, where local resources are scarce, the
great majority of irrigators prefer to obtain
FIGURE 5.
Arrears of payment for fees and charges: Saga irrigation scheme, 1992–96.24
FIGURE 6.
Arrears of payment for fees and charges, Kourani-Baria II irrigation scheme, 199396.
their fertilizers at the cooperative. To meet
this demand, the cooperative must buy
before the season commences, but then the
members are entitled to wait until any time
before the end of the following season,
before the rules oblige them to make
payment. The scale of this difficulty, for the
cooperatives, is shown by the fact that, at
Kourani-Baria, the amount of the accounts
for these input charges has now grown to
exceed the amount of the fees.
• A proportion of irrigators, as indicated by the
arrears levels in figures 5 and 6, delay
payment even beyond the end of the allowed
grace period.
The result of these pressures is that the
present cash needs of the cooperatives are
much greater than what was initially envisaged.
Because of this they are unable to develop the
expected savings, and are not setting aside
resources which would enable them to deal with
any serious emergencies, such as the
replacement of a large pump.
Table 10 shows the state of the three rice-
producing cooperative funds at a specific point in
time, the end of the wet season of 1996. If the
restricted accounts (that is, the funds intended
for capital purposes) were really retained, these
organizations would all be insolvent. The
Kourani-Baria cooperatives are insolvent in any
case, and can only make cash payments for
vital needs such as electricity and fertilizers after
considerable delays. Kourani-Baria II cooperative
has not yet been able to put anything into its
savings account. The most successful of these
cooperatives, Saga, has developed a savings
account, but has to access it regularly to meet
current cash needs.
Institutional Strength
In the preceding section we have described the
financial capacities of the cooperatives, which
can be measured and quantified. However,
although finance is certainly very important, it
should not be considered as the only factor in
sustaining the cooperatives. In this section, we25
TABLE 10.
Financial position of the three rice-producing cooperatives as at 30 October 1996 (Units: FCFA).
Saga Kourani-Baria I Kourani-Baria II
Assets
Bank accounts:
Current account 495,552 224,338 87,567
Restricted account 24,856,818 4,278,248 
Frozen accounts (Niger Rural Development Bank) 2,494,590 10,778,053 
Subtotal 27,846,960 15,280,639 87,567
Debts owed to the cooperative:
Irrigator arrears 27,544,009 70,989,955 14,751,365
Others 2,708,868 4,755,698
Subtotal 30,252,877 75,745,653 14,751,365
Total of assets 58,099,837 91,026,292 14,838,932
Liabilities
Debts owed by the cooperative to:
Fertilizer suppliers 3,100,000 52,003,680 
NIGELEC (Niger Electricity Company) 597,448 2,613,473 
ONAHA 1,000,000 496,540 8,197,377
RINI (Niger Rice Processing and Marketing Company) 1,822,690 500,000 
Central Input and Supplies Agency  1,961,500
Seed farm 1,560,125 
Total of debts 8,080,263 55,613,693 10,158,877
Net assets 50,019,574 35,412,599 4,680,055
Net current assets 19,980,975 -46,355,409 -10,071,310
Net current unrestricted assets -4,875,843 -50,633,657 -10,071,310
Net assets per available hectare 126,312 87,288 18,260
Net current assets per available hectare 50,457 -114,260 -39,295
Net current unrestricted assets per available hectare -12,313 -124,806 -39,295
Source: System directors and accountants of the cooperatives.
Notes:
1. Net assets = total financial assets - total financial liabilities.
2. Net current assets = net assets - frozen accounts - irrigator arrears.
3. Net current unrestricted assets = net current assets - restricted accounts.
review the available evidence about the strength
and the longer-term viability of these
organizations. In making this assessment, we do
not have clearly quantified parameters, and must
depend, to some extent, on our own judgements.
In their responses during field interviews,
irrigators in the two Kourani-Baria systems
frequently showed that they had low levels of
satisfaction with their organizations. The
organizations have not, generally, developed
attitudes of transparency and accountability, in
their relations with their members. They have also
not developed ways of involving their members
into their decision-making processes, or
consulting them generally about planning
decisions. Many farmers said that they were not
aware who their GMP representative for water
management was, or what their cooperative’s
plans were, and in other ways, they expressed
alienation from the system of management. The
irrigators show by their behavior that they do not
have high respect for the decisions reached by
the executive committees of the cooperatives.
The relationship of the organizations to their
members is affected by the land tenure situation.
Irrigators do not obtain formal title to their lands.
The cooperative does not own the land, but it
has one of the basic powers of an owner, since26
it can evict and replace an irrigator who breaks
any of the key rules. (Strictly, this power is held
by a local committee that includes some
government representatives; but in practice, it
seems that these committees usually support the
cooperatives). The common reason for exercise
of this power is nonpayment of fees. The
cooperatives vary in their use of this power. The
Saga cooperative has not used it at all in recent
years, but the Kourani-Baria I cooperative has
evicted some 43 percent of its members over a
period of 5 years. It seems reasonable to
surmise that the exercising of this power
changes the relationship between the irrigators
and the organization, and there is no evidence
that using it has improved performance.
Other aspects of transparency, such as the
holding of regular general meetings of all
members, the recording and publicizing of
decisions, presentation of annual expenditure
plans for authorization by members, and
presentation of annual accounts or reports to
members, are generally absent. Elections of
office-bearers and committees occur, and the
timing of these seems to be respected. These
elections take place at the lower level (the
GMP). However, members frequently state that
they are not informed about what happens
afterwards, such as the allocation of specific
duties among the elected committee members.
The initial constitution of each cooperative is
adopted by the members, in accordance with a
standard document provided by the government.
This standard constitution specifies procedures
for amendment by the members. No case of
actual amendment was found among the
cooperatives studied. Aspects of the standard
constitution that require clarifying details at each
individual cooperative (for example, specifying
the sanctions and procedures that can be used
in cases of rule violation) therefore remain
vague.
Some problems of institutional development
can no doubt be traced to inherent conflicts that
arise when the new form of organization,
required for an irrigation system, interacts with
and appears to challenge previously existing
traditional organizational structures. Cernea and
Meinzen-Dick (1994), describing the
establishment of irrigator organizations in Niger
and Senegal, wrote that “…the traditional forms
of social organizations were deemed to be
inappropriate: they were dominated by chieftains
using them for personal gains and were
unsuitable for efficient agricultural production.”
Problems of this type were noticeable: for
example, in the Tillakaïna scheme, effective
dominance of the irrigation organization was
achieved by a person of forceful personality and
strong traditional and religious linkages. But there
are grounds for thinking that such problems may
be temporary, and may respond to pressures,
which derive from the wish to use the economic
opportunity that the irrigation system represents.
In this particular case, after a few years the
dominant person was removed in an election
after dissatisfaction with his style and
performance grew, and organizational control
then moved to a group of younger irrigators.
Summary of Performance Findings
We can draw the following conclusions about the
performance of these four systems:
• In normal years, without severe flood or
drought events, annual production values of
900,000–1,000,000 FCFA per developed
hectare are achieved at Saga and Tillakaïna;
750,000–800,000 FCFA at Kourani-Baria II,
and 650,000–700,000 FCFA at Kourani-Baria I.
These are valued at the (post-devaluation)
price levels of 1995.
5 These production
5The US$ equivalent of these production value, in PPP terms are: US$6,125–6,833 at Saga and Tillakaina, US$5,125–5,466 at Kourani-Baria
II, and US$4,433–4,784 at Kourani-Baria I.27
levels at Saga and Tillakaïna can be
considered good (although the potential is
probably somewhat 20% greater); but the
results at Kourani-Baria II show a significant
deficit relative to the potential of the site,
and at Kourani-Baria I the deficit is larger.
• The ratio of water pumped into the irrigation
systems to water actually used by the crops
is in the range of 1.65–2.50. Though most or
probably all of this water returns to the river
and is available for reuse, the large volumes
of water that have to be pumped cause
substantial increases to the pumping
charges that irrigators must pay. At Kourani-
Baria I, the installed pumping capacity is
only just able to meet peak demands and,
therefore, requires prolonged pumping hours
and nocturnal irrigation.
• Farm-level productivity of water delivered is
high at Saga (1.05 kg/m
3 for paddy) but only
moderate at Kourani-Baria I (0.60 kg/m
3). In
value terms, the gross product value
obtained at Saga is about 10.1 times the
gross cost of delivering water at the
landholding, and at Kourani-Baria I this ratio
is about 7.9. In these calculations, the gross
cost includes all identifiable water-related
costs, and capital and renewal charges for
pumping equipment, calculated according to
the standard formulas used by ONAHA.
• Equity in water distribution is not
satisfactory. At Kourani-Baria I the least-
supplied secondary canal block receives
70.6 percent of average water supply, and at
Saga 79.5 percent; this degree of inequity is
certainly among the reasons for the deficit of
production specially at Kourani Baria.
• Rewards to irrigator families are moderately
good. Net revenue per person-day of family
labor is generally more than 1.75 times the
current cost of agricultural labor, and the
overall weighted mean of this ratio is 2.19,
which probably explains why most irrigator
families are adequately motivated and are
maintaining a high intensity of land use.
• Irrigation service fees are very high, by
comparison with levels generally reported in
other developing countries. On average, they
are just over 20.0 percent of gross product
value. Irrigators in general succeed in paying
these fees, but a significant proportion of
payments is late, resulting in cash-flow
problems for the cooperatives.
• Arrears of payments by irrigators to their
cooperatives are a serious problem at
Kourani-Baria I. At Saga and at Kourani-
Baria II arrears seem to have stabilized or
reduced in recent seasons.
• All the cooperatives calculate fees according
to the standard method prescribed by the
government. Although this method
incorporates a substantial savings element,
amounting to nearly 20.0 percent of the fee,
which is supposed to accumulate in special
restricted accounts, the cooperatives have
not succeeded in setting aside these
savings. In fact, they use this money to
provide their working capital requirements.28
is greatly reduced by the fact that it is shared
among all members of the cooperative, who may
number about 1,000. Although water losses
appear to be in the order of 50 percent of the
amount pumped  and although energy for
pumping is the biggest item in the cooperative
budgets, it is not economically sensible for any
household to apply its labor towards reducing
this loss, since the household can expect to
receive only about one-thousandth part of any
benefit that may result. On the contrary, the
reasons for the failure of numerous attempts to
persuade the irrigators to reduce water use by
following tighter irrigation schedules seem very
likely to be linked to labor questions. Families
having different labor situations may find it
difficult to conform to the discipline of jointly
organized timing of irrigation, and they may
perceive no benefit to themselves from
conforming.
Savings and Investment
The financial burden of providing an irrigation
service has to be borne by the cooperative. It is
responsible for paying for all the common
services that are implied in the provision of an
irrigation service. These include, in Niger, a quite
wide spectrum of pre- and post-harvest services
(such as fertilizers, and marketing) as well as
the operating costs such as power, and
administrative costs such as accounting.
The tasks of major maintenance and renewal
of equipment are not allocated so clearly. The
wish of the government about this aspect is
however clear enough. It lacks resources for
ensuring these services, and so it has built in a
“savings” element into the standard method of
calculating the irrigation service fees. Each
cooperative collects money in excess of its
expenditure, because of the items of capital and
savings charges included in the fee calculation.
In this section we try to identify specific
constraints to account for performance deficits,
notably at the two Kourani-Baria systems.
Labor
Labor is not abundant. Because the availability
of farm equipment is low, the number of labor
days required for producing a crop is very large.
Household economic strategies involve a range
of activities, among which irrigated agriculture is
only one, and is to some extent in competition
with others for a share of the family labor
resource. On average, irrigated agriculture
provides 41.2 percent of household gross
income at Saga, but only 24.9 percent of net
income. It is reasonable to assume that
households are motivated by net results. Hence,
irrigated agriculture competes with other
activities, which are altogether three times more
significant to the family.
Households would be expected to make their
economic decisions with a view to maximizing
the net returns to their land and labor. The
objective of achieving good returns to family
labor seems to be achieved in general,
according to the data of table 10. On average,
household labor in irrigated agriculture is
rewarded at more than double the current wage
rates of agricultural labor. This explains the
motivation of households to maintain generally
high crop intensities. It could also account for
the lower crop intensities at Kourani-Baria I,
where the returns to labor are substantially less.
Reducing the consumption of water is not
likely to be a prominent objective at the
household level. Rather, it should be expected
that the household would normally seek to obtain
as much water as needed to irrigate its crop
adequately. Households have to pay increased
fees for water lost through seepage or through
mal-distribution, but the impact of this extra cost
Constraints29
However, this is not profit, because it is
supposed to be placed immediately in the
restricted account to allow the cooperative to
accumulate reserves for future contingencies
such as equipment renewals. In reality, as table
10 has shown, this is not happening. The
restricted accounts are more or less empty.
Even at the Saga cooperative, whose financial
performance is the best among the four study
schemes, the amount in the restricted account is
small, and it is used in each season to finance
current expenditure.
The roots of these difficulties are in the
tightness of the financial rules applied to the
cooperatives, through the standard accounting
procedures prescribed by the government. The
origin of this stringent attitude is not clear, but
we may probably surmise that (when these
cooperatives began some 20 years ago) the
government sponsors of the policy may have
feared that there would be risks of corrupt
behavior, or of simple loss of money through
inexperience. Perhaps tight rules were
introduced to reduce such risks. The result is
that, under these accounting procedures, it is
impossible for any cooperative to increase its
financial assets. It cannot make a profit, since
that must be used to reduce the seasonal fee,
but it can make a loss, through management
incompetence. Since these organizations exist in
an environment where business management
skills are scarce, it should be expected that,
over time, the net financial assets of every
cooperative must reduce. Table 10 shows that
this is the result that has indeed occurred.
This situation is aggravated by the
expansion of the annual budgets of the
cooperatives. Year by year, the cooperatives
must produce larger amounts of cash to pre-
finance the seasonal activities. The growth of the
budgets has had two primary causes: first, the
ordinary monetary processes of inflation, which
were given a large acceleration by the currency
devaluation of 1994, and second, the wish of the
members (especially at the remoter Kourani-
Baria systems) that their organizations should
expand services, especially the purchase and
resale of fertilizers. These expanded budgets
can be met only by using unsatisfactory devices,
such as delaying payment, or utilizing the
restricted “savings” funds as working capital.
The effects of these aspects have been
particularly apparent in Kourani-Baria I. Its
assets have reduced, partly due to a previous
period of unsatisfactory management, and its
budget has grown, with fertilizer purchases now
dominating it. The cooperative has to wait for up
to a year before its members repay their
fertilizer supplies. Such delay is allowed within
the accounting rules.
The impact of all these effects varies,
because the initial working capital provided to
each cooperative varied (table 11), not only in
regard to the amounts provided, but also the
proportions provided in cash and in other forms
such as equipment (whose real value often
turned out to be quite negligible, because of
suitability defects). Probably, the initial foreign
donors supporting each irrigation system were
unaware of the longer-term impact of their
decisions about the appropriate amounts of
capital that such an organization would need.
Maintenance
Maintenance of these irrigation systems has to
be considered at several levels. Smaller
maintenance tasks can be performed by the
cooperatives through their own members or
employed staff. Larger tasks need at least
technical guidance, and perhaps financial as
well, from the government. At present, neither is
being done well. Collaborative minor
maintenance, which is within the capacity of the
cooperative, the GMP, or small field-channel
groups, is often defective, and in many cases,
especially in the field drains, it does not seem to
happen at all. Almost all the irrigation systems
have areas where tasks that could be done at30
these levels have been omitted. It seems
reasonable to think that this is an important
factor contributing to the observed inequities of
water distribution. Major maintenance is not in a
better condition. Items that are beyond the
technical capacity of the users (such as
automatic structures that have become jammed)
remain unrepaired for many years. Protective
dikes and other large works also receive little
attention. Pumps, which have to be taken out of
service for repairing mechanical and electrical
faults, are sometimes not returned to service for
many months.
In each of these cases, the problem seems
to be due to a lack of clarity about
responsibilities or finance. Common tasks that
can be done (in principle) by farmers require
organization and allocation of duties. For
example, it is not clear whether a household with
a large landholding should supply the same labor
as another that farms less. There are generally
no systems for monitoring and recording labor
contributions, and there is no provision in the
rule systems for small graduated penalties for
those who do not take part. Without these
features, it is predictable (Ostrom’s principles 2
and 5) that people will not generally apply their
labor in this way.
Management Skills
Niger has some of the lowest levels of literacy
and basic schooling in the world. Irrigation
systems are generally located in the rural
environment, where these educational levels will
be even lower than the average. It is not,
therefore, surprising that the management skills
of the rural population are very limited. The
problem is made more difficult by the complexity
of the management and financial systems that
the government and its foreign donors chose to
install. In other countries, where governments
are trying to create self-financing irrigation
organizations, these systems are usually much
easier to understand and to operate than the
Nigérien system. For example, the use of a true-
cost system of fee calculation, which means that
each seasonal fee is calculated from the net
expenditure of the previous season, requires
continuous attention to maintaining control of all
bills, individual personal accounts for every
TABLE 11.
Initial operating capital provided to the cooperatives.
Cooperative Date of Funds provided Total start-up
funding
Cash Equipment or inputs Total
 capital per
developed hectare
(FCFA) (FCFA) (FCFA) (FCFA/ha)
Saga – 15,683,031 12,604,000  28,287,037  69,450
Kourani-Baria I 1989 19,835,830 41,667,818 61,503,648 144,714
Kourani-Baria II 1989 12,417,551 23,488,398 35,905,949 134,077
Tillakaïna 1983 10,400,000  10,400,000 166,400
Sources: (quoted in IIMI 1998):
(a) Gauff Ingénieure: Rapport Final, Mise en valeur du périmètre de Kourani-Baria. Dec 1989. [Annexes 2 and 8 and chapter 5]
(b) Didier Allely: Coopérative Agricole de Tillakaina: Manuel de procédures comptables. May 1985. Page 7.
Notes:
1. The initial area developed at Tillakaïna was 62.5 ha.
2. The equipment fund provided at the Kourani-Baria cooperatives was not in the form of cash. Most of the funds had already been applied,
during installation of these irrigation systems, to purchase agricultural equipment, which was sold on credit to irrigators. The irrigators were
expected to repay these loans to the new cooperatives, but in reality, much of this fund was not recovered by the cooperatives.31
member household, strict supervision of arrears,
and so on. Some cooperatives have been able
to apply this system. Some have not succeeded.
There are other areas where the deficit of
management skills and experience may have
direct impacts on the organizational
performance. Some are intangible, but may be
significant, such as the alienation felt by
members towards the cooperative.
These problems reflect unfamiliarity with
formal processes of record keeping and other
transparency mechanisms. It is likely that they
would be easier to handle if the organizations
were smaller. The size of the cooperatives in the
Niger Valley is however dictated by the typical
capacity of the pump stations. Organizations
with several hundred members, or even well
over a thousand, therefore required to take
responsibility for payment of some large central
bills, such as for electricity.
Summary and Conclusions
Verifying Study Themes
Under “Themes of the Study,” p.2, we stated a
set of four themes to be addressed by this study
of the Nigérien irrigation systems and their
cooperatives. We now review each of these four,
in the light of the evidence presented from field
observations.
a. There is a high degree of interactivity among
various domains that are superficially quite
different (water management, agricultural
practices, markets and finance,
organizational constitution and processes,
management skills, irrigators’ alternative
uses of their labor, etc.), which means that
intervention by an external organization if
designed without attention to all these
factors, is likely to fail.
The field data have confirmed this at many
points. These are complex systems set in a
complex social setting. Their users are not (on the
whole) primarily irrigation farmers. They have
complex household economies with multiple small
interests. Their irrigation activities cannot be
separated from their rain-fed and other activities,
because these constrain what they can and
cannot do. In particular, the irrigators have
difficulty in following a sound agricultural calendar,
and (at some sites) they seem to be losing
heavily as a result of this failure. An organizational
constitution has been externally imposed upon
these people, and in some critical aspects it
constrains them so severely that the organization
cannot discharge its assigned functions.
b. There is a deficit of organizational skills in
the rural environment of a country such as
Niger, where rural resources of every sort
are scarce, and this presents special
difficulties for managing relatively large new
organizations.
This point has been discussed in the
preceding section. It is a major constraint at the
present time. However, it is not the kind of
constraint that cannot be overcome. This seems
to be the area, where capacity building would be
most effective. There are some particular
aspects where better management skills could
be most valuable. These include communication,
and record keeping, both of which are central to
developing transparency and equity. Training that
is concentrated on developing these skills should
be valuable.32
c. A sound set of financial procedures is
necessary, to ensure solvency and viability in
these organizations, but it is difficult to
ensure these without perpetuating the
government involvement and, therefore,
attitudes of dependency on the government.
The government has established a strong
set of accounting procedures. The rules are
detailed and clear, but the principles that are
used are more complicated than in many other
countries. They enable the government
supervisory officials (the System Director, and
his superiors within ONAHA) to monitor the
finances of the organizations, to compare
different cooperatives, identify those which are
getting into trouble, and so on. These rules also
can reduce risks of corrupt behavior, and make
it less likely that a cooperative will be brought to
financial disaster by bad office bearers.
However, they are the government’s own rules,
and do not seem to meet the organizations’ own
needs in every way.
The cooperatives cannot make profit, cannot
expand their financial base, and so cannot
expand their activities. Some other countries
have had considerable success with “multi-
functional” organizations of irrigators, which
develop other businesses such as forestry or
fishery according to their situation, or which
provide sociocultural facilities to enhance their
members’ quality of life. It would be difficult for
the Nigérien cooperatives to evolve in that way.
The expansion of the Kourani-Baria I cooperative
into fertilizer provision has already over-strained
its financial situation.
In theory, this should not be the case. The
standard document used as the initial
constitution of a cooperative states explicitly that
it could be amended by the members. This
appears to make it possible for a cooperative to
adopt different rules, even about fee calculation.
However, the research team could identify no
case of a cooperative using this power of
amendment. The present reality, therefore, is
that the cooperatives follow standard
procedures, laid down by the government, and in
some important aspects these procedures seem
to serve government objectives rather than the
members’ own objectives. In these
circumstances, it is difficult to predict an early
end to the condition of dependency on the
government.
d. The organizational design in actual use is
not in conformity with the principles of
sustainability developed by Ostrom (1992).
The eight principles of Ostrom were
presented on pages 11–12. At present, the
organizational arrangements in the Nigérien
cooperatives violate, in some degree, each of
these principles. These eight principles are
probably the best prescription presently available
for the design of an autonomous organization of
irrigators. Any adjustments that would bring the
Nigérien organizations nearer to conformity with
these principles seem likely to improve their
sustainability. If specific priorities are sought, it
seems likely that the greatest impacts might be
obtained by adapting to the second, fourth, fifth,
seventh and eighth of these principles, aiming
respectively at equity, transparency, rule
compliance, autonomy from government, and
functional decentralization.
The cooperatives are large, and their size
puts practical stresses on the available
management skills in the community. The eighth
Ostrom principle recommends that there be
different organizational levels for different
functions. A smaller organizational level, the GMP,
already exists, but has not been given many
effective powers. Some formal delegation of
functions to that level, and enhancement of the
capacities existing at that level (such as provision
of a small office and store as an administrative
focus in each GMP), might help to overcome
some of the observed management deficiencies,
by (for example) facilitating communication and
organization of group work.33
Task-based development of local rules,
equitable sharing of contributions and benefits,
and application of sanctions, also do not seem
to have occurred yet. The opportunity to initiate
these developments during the construction
phase appears to have been missed, even in the
most recent case of the Kourani-Baria sites,
because rules were imposed externally rather
than developed by discussion and negotiation
within the communities.
Sustainability
The irrigation systems do not appear to be
sustainable, unless there is some change in the
policy of the government or in the procedures of
the cooperatives. The essential difficulty is the
financial weaknesses observed at all the
cooperatives. None has been able to build up a
reserve fund that could enable them to deal with
future needs for major repairs and renewals. In
all cases, resources intended for building such
funds are used to finance current operational
needs. The lack of liquid assets in the
cooperatives causes deficits in technical
performance levels, especially at the Kourani-
Baria systems. It prevents cooperatives from
maintaining stocks of fertilizers for their
members, and consequently, fertilizers are
applied at times and in quantities that are far
from the agronomic optimal patterns (IIMI 1998).
The present system of accounting does not
allow the cooperatives to make profit, so they
cannot solve their liquidity problems within the
present framework. They cannot increase their
net assets and, therefore, cannot respond
effectively to the increased costs, arising from
price inflation, expansion of activities, or any
other reason. On the other hand, it is quite
possible that a cooperative will undergo a period
of weak, inexperienced or dishonest
management and thereby lose some of its
resources. There is no way, at present, for even
an excellent new management committee to
recover from that, except by applying the capital
renewal funds to operational uses. At the least
successful of the four cooperatives that were
studied, Kourani-Baria I, there are many signs of
lack of support by the members for their
organization, and many criticisms were voiced
during field interviews. This cooperative, in an
attempt to resolve the cash deficiencies, has
used its power to evict members who have
arrears. The use of this power, however, does
not automatically lead to debt repayments, and
may increase the sense of alienation between
the irrigators and the committee.
Since so many of these difficulties seem to
be linked to cash shortage, it seems important
to study the initial capital needs of a new
organization of irrigators. There has been little
discussion in the literature about this, and it is to
some extent specific to the local situation,
because it is linked to the accounting and cost-
collection system. In the Nigérien cooperatives,
there is inconsistency in the processes that
different donors have applied, but in every case,
the needs have been underestimated. If farmers
can pay by delivering part of their crop to the
cooperative after the end of the season, and if
the time limit for this payment is six months (the
duration of the next season) then the
cooperative’s need for operating capital will be
an amount approaching the costs of two full
seasons. The actual sum that this represents
depends on the specific range of services that
members want their organization to provide. In
these four cooperatives, the operating capital
requirement seems to be of the order of
180,000–260,000 FCFA per developed hectare.
The amounts of operating capital provided to
these government-sponsored organizations at
their inception were only a small fraction of the
true need (see table 11).34
General Policy
The systems that have relatively convenient
market access (Saga and Tillakaïna schemes)
show good performance in yield, land utilization,
and gross output. The remoter systems
(Kourani-Baria I and II schemes) fall farther
below potential, but their output results are still
moderately good by current developing-country
standards for such enterprises.
The fee-charging process for these irrigation
systems has been devised and imposed by the
government, and it is one of the most stringent
fee schemes being applied in the developing
world. Fee calculations include all actual
operational costs, components for the initial
capital cost of installing the schemes, savings
towards future major repairs and renewals, and
a contribution towards the costs of the
government’s supervisory agency. The irrigation
service fee paid by an irrigator to the
cooperative organization that manages the
system is a little over 20 percent of gross
product value. In addition, the irrigator may also
buy other services, such as input supply and
marketing from the cooperative.
In general, these large fee amounts are
being paid, and fee collection ratios are usually
high, in the range of 90–100 percent. However,
the scale of the fees puts obvious stresses on
household capacities to pay and there is
generally significant delay in payment. These
payment delays, in turn, stress the cooperatives,
which have inadequate operating capital and
have no means to increase it.
Management weaknesses in the cooperatives
include lack of communication and consequently
lack of transparency. Improving management
skills through carefully targeted training and
capacity building initiatives could lead to better
coordination of agricultural processes and
reduction in costs, especially water-pumping
charges, which is the highest cost item.
The size of the organizations is probably too
large, in relation to the available management
skills. The GMP level of organization rather than
the cooperative, conforms more nearly to the
criteria indicated for the base unit size in such
organizations, but it has not been invested with
significant functions, funds, hardware or
organisational structure, so it is not a genuine
base unit. Actions to strengthen the GMP level
are therefore desirable. Such actions should
involve formal transfers of certain specific
functions, from the cooperative to the GMP. The
cooperatives show continued dependency on the
government, and have not yet learned to develop
rules and processes of their own.
The farmer-financed operations of the Niger
River Valley irrigation systems are at present
producing acceptable results. The irrigators and
their leaders deserve recognition for their
success in operating these systems under an
unusually strict financial scheme. However,
although current performance in conventional
terms such as output value and fee collection is
above average and in some respects very good,
the situation does not appear to be sustainable
unless significant modifications of the
organizational system can be made.35
ANNEX.
Specimen computation of irrigation service fees: Saga, dry season 1994.
Account No. Item Amount (FCFA)
A. FIXED CHARGES
6811 Amortization of irrigation pumping equipment 2,054,449
6812 Amortization of drainage pumping equipment 486,445
Amortization of motor cycle 106,250
6821 Provision for renewal of irrigation pumping equipment 1,725,776
6822 Provision for renewal of drainage pumping equipment 408,411
6824 Investment fund 1,525,352
6825 Solidarity fund 344,916




6103 Plant protection 215,550
6111-3 Lubricants and fuel 96,000
6140 Electricity for pump station 7,475,992
6160 Spare parts 637,945
6170 Miscellaneous supplies 450,458
6171 Office supplies 354,445
6220-30 Staff transport and other transport 23,400
6300 Technical support by ONAHA 1,520,000
6320 Infrastructure maintenance 781,405
6330-3 Other maintenance 91,600
6340 Land preparation 338,975
6350 Temporary labor wages 98,750
6360-80 Other services 86,300
6410 Assurance 19,992
6420 Subventions and donations 100,000
6460 Reception expenses 90,190
6480 Travel expenses 120,000
6510 Staff salaries        2,478,052
6520 Honorarium to President 150,000
6521 Other compensation 97,000
6530 Social charges 216,225
6540/6610 Taxes and miscellaneous items 9,010
Sub total of variable charges 17,245,819
Total of all charges 23,897,418
C. FEE CALCULATION
Area cultivated 380 ha
Fee per hectare 62,887 FCFA
Fee for 0.25 ha 15,725 FCFA36
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